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In this paper, cyber attack detection and isolation is studied on a network
of UAVs in a formation flying setup. As the UAVs communicate to reach
consensus on their states while making the formation, the communication
network among the UAVs makes them vulnerable to a potential attack from
malicious adversaries. Two types of attacks pertinent to a network of UAVs
have been considered: a node attack on the UAVs and a deception attack on
the communication between the UAVs. UAVs formation control presented
using a consensus algorithm to reach a pre-specified formation. A node
and a communication path deception cyber attacks on the UAV’s network
are considered with their respective models in the formation setup. For
these cyber attacks detection, a bank of Unknown Input Observer (UIO)
based distributed fault detection scheme proposed to detect and identify
the compromised UAV in the formation. A rule based on the residuals
generated using the bank of UIOs are used to detect attacks and identify
the compromised UAV in the formation. Further, an algorithm developed
to remove the faulty UAV from the network once an attack detected and
the compromised UAV isolated while maintaining the formation flight with
a missing UAV node.
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I. Introduction
Recent advancement in UAVs capabilities, operating in an autonomous mode, a high-end
computing and communication infrastructures onboard have spurred a wide interest from
law enforcement to commercial sectors in deploying a large number of UAVs. These make
the UAVs an ideal candidate for a coordinated task where it is not possible to perform
the task single-handedly and efficiently [1, 2, 3] such as finding and rescue mission, or law
enforcement such as border patrolling and drug trafficking monitoring [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
These tasks rely on the cooperative control nature of multi-UAVs and their interaction with
the environment with all its uncertainties. Flocking in birds or school of fish has a motion
with a well-coordinated pattern. These inspired the robotic community to develop a similar
structure for a coordinated task or flight formation control, which basically uses a distributed
control strategy.
The decentralized control nature of the system makes it vulnerable to malfunction and
possible threats or attacks [10]. In addition, UAVs are cyber-physical systems (CPS) with
a tight integration of physical process, computational resource, measurement and communi-
cation capabilities. The control unit monitors and controls the system status while coordi-
nating the flight through sensors and actuators onboard [11]. Since many UAVs use off-the-
shelf communication equipment and computing components (flight controller boards) with
well-known protocols, these make them more open and prone to cyber-attacks from adver-
saries [12, 13]. Thus, the use of standard protocols on mission critical systems leads to a
source of cybersecurity vulnerability where adversaries are capable of exploiting commonly
known Internet vulnerabilities [14, 15]. Many unmanned vehicles use encryption of data
channels to prevent cyber attacks but relying on it as the only defense mechanism is mis-
guided [16]. In addition, there are attacks on multiple sensors which can corrupt the state of
the UAV without the need of breaking the encryption. Examples of these attacks are spoof-
ing of GPS or Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) signals [17, 18, 13].
Traditional computer science cybersecurity approach focused on the integrity of data, en-
cryption and restricting access to sensitive data. It only protects the computing resource of
the cyber-physical system and is oblivious to the cyber-physical interaction [19]. While this
is necessary to keep the system secured, it fails to restrict access to the system [20, 21]. These
put the security of the previously closed and isolated control systems to a new dimension of
threats where classical control cannot deal with in its fault identification and isolation (FDI)
scheme used to identify and clear faults in control systems. Thus, the problem of the UAV
security is studied here from a complementary control theory and fault detection perspective
where compatibility of the measurements with the underlying physical process of the control
mechanism is exploited.
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A formation flight of UAVs is an example of multi-agent systems performing a shared
task using inter-vehicle communication to coordinate their action and reach a consensus
on the desired moving formation setup. As defined by Olfati-Saber et al [22], “consensus
means to reach an agreement regarding a certain quality of interest that depends on the state
of all agents. Consensuses algorithm is an interaction rule that specified the information
exchange between an agent and all of its neighbors on the network.” The consensus problem
for networks of dynamic systems was presented by Olfati-Sabri and Murray in[23] and showed
that connectivity of the network is the key to reaching a consensus. Fax and Murray [24]
presented a vehicle cooperative network performing a shared task. They made use of Nyquist
criterion which uses the graph Laplacian eigenvalues to prove the stability of the formation.
A decentralized control of vehicle formation was presented by Lafferriere and Williams [25]
using a consensus algorithm, where they proved the necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of a decentralized linear feedback controller.
Much of the recent research on distributed control system security in cyber-physical
systems focused on electric power gird estate estimator and sensors anomaly affected by ad-
versaries manipulating sensor measurements. Observer-based approaches have been studied
for a networked power system fault detection [26, 27]. An intrusion detection scheme for
linear consensus network with a misbehaving node was presented in [28], where the authors
used unknown input observer (UIO). Other results were presented in [29, 30] where the au-
thors used a bank of UIO systems fault and cyber attack detection for a network of a power
system. The sufficient condition for the existence of a bank of UIOs was given as the graph
representation of the system being connected. The nodes in the network were modeled as a
second-order linear time-invariant system.
A distributed real-time fault detection in a cooperative multi-agent system was presented
in[31]. The authors introduced a fault detection framework in which each node monitors
its neighbors using local information. The authors in [32], introduced a fuzzy rule-based
hierarchical fault detection and isolation framework for spacecraft formation. Simple fuzzy
rules were developed to describe the relationship between faults and to isolate faulty satellites
in the formation. In another work [33], a distributed, model-based and qualitative fault
diagnosis approach for formations of mobile robots was presented. The model of the mobile
robot and the communication among them were modeled as a bond graph. The authors
in [34], investigated a geometric distributed FDI methodology by developing a bank of
local/decentralized detection filters for detecting faults in other spacecraft, while they are in
a formation flight by determining the required observability subspace of the local system. A
relationship between the number of detectable malicious or faulty nodes and the topology
was investigated in [35]. The authors showed that the topology of the network completely
characterized the resilience of the linear iterative system. It showed that for f malicious
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nodes, a node was able to detect the faults of all nodes if the node has at least 2f vertex-
disjoint paths from every other non-neighboring nodes. Authors in [36] considered a cyber
attack on the critical part of unmanned aerial system, the state estimator. They showed
how a stealthy attack can fail the estate estimator without being detected by the monitoring
system.
Control theory and fault detection schemes can be used in a distributed system setup to
detect a malicious cyber attack on a network of UAVs in a formation flight. The main contri-
bution will be the detection of a possible cyber attack on a network of UAVs in a formation
flying setup using a bank of UIO observers. In addition to the detection of a possible cyber
attack, the UIO will be used to identify the compromised UAV in the network. The cyber
attack is modeled as a node attack and a deception attack on the communication channel
while the UAVs are performing the coordinated task. Furthermore, a faulty UAV removing
algorithm developed to remove the malicious or under attack UAV from the network. The
algorithm will remove the faulty UAV for a 2-connected network while maintaining connec-
tivity of the flying formation network and the formation setup with a missing node UAV.
The key contributions of this work are a distributed UIO based cyber attack detection and a
safe removal of compromised UAV from a formation flying network. While preliminary ideas
and results were reported in the authors’ earlier work [37], this paper presents expanded
theoretical results including attack isolation as well as a new set of numerical results.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section II, the dynamics of
UAVs and their communication model in the formation control is presented. In section
III, a formal definition and model of a node and a communication path deception cyber
attack in the formation are described. UIO based fault detection and a compromised UAV
identification with a faulty UAV removal algorithm are presented. A simulation result of a
formation control, cyber attack detection and removal of compromised UAV in the formation
is presented in section IV. Finally, in section V, a summary of the main result and some
thoughts in the future direction are provided.
II. Formation Control of UAVs
In this section, the formation control adapted from [24] so that it will suit for the specific
purpose of this paper and dynamics of the UAVs considered. Starting from here, in a
formation flying the UAVs will be referred as agents or nodes interchangeably.
Consider N UAVs coordinating themselves to achieve a pre-specified formation defined
by relative positions with respect to each other. To describe the interaction architecture
in a formal manner, consider an undirected graph G = (V , E), where V the set of nodes
V = {v1, ...vN} and E set of edge, E ⊆ V × V . The neighbors of UAV i are denoted by
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Ni = {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E}. Every node represents a UAV and the edges correspond to the
inter-vehicle communication. The adjacent matrix A ∈ {0, 1}N×N represents the adjacency
relationship in the graph G with an element aij = 1 if (vi, vj) ∈ E and aij = 0 otherwise.
The neighbor of agent i, denoted as Ni is the set of agents such that aji = 1. The graph
Laplacian is defined as
LG = D −A (1)
where D is a diagonal matrix with dii representing the cardinality of Ni.
Each UAV’s motion in d-dimensional Euclidean space is modeled as a second order sys-
tem:
x˙i = Aixi +Biui, xi ∈ Rn (2)
where the state variable xi consists of the configuration variables (i.e., position) and their
derivatives (i.e., velocity) and the control input ui represents the acceleration commands;
the system matrices take the form of:
Ai = diag

 0 1
αij βij
 , j = 1, . . . , d, Bi = In ⊗
0
1

with appropriate αij > 0, βij ≥ 0, where In is n × n identity matrix and ⊗ denotes the
Kronecker product. A UAV is assumed to obtain information about its motions via the local
observation model:
yi = Cixi. (3)
For notational simplicity, the derivation hereafter considers the case where a UAV can access
to its full local state, i.e., Ci = In, while Remark will discuss on how the main results can
extend to a more generic case.
Let denote h˜i as some possible desired position vector of agent i for i ∈ {1, . . . N}. For
example, if the desired formation is a planar hexagon (as in Figure 1), one choice of hi is:
h˜i =
[
R cos(pi/3× i) R sin(pi/3× i)
]T
.
The UAVs are called in formation h at time t if there are constant vector p such that
xi,pos − h˜i = p, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
where xi,pos is the n-dimensional vector consisting of the odd entries of xi. Also, the UAVs
are said to converge to the formation h when the limit limt→∞ xi,pos(t) − h˜i exists and are
same for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} [25].
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Figure 1: UAVs in a hexagonal formation for N = 6.
Interaction of agent i with other agents for formation flight is through the control input
term ui. To achieve formation, the feedback signal used to generate this control input is
the difference between its own offset from the desired formation vector and that of the
neighboring agents:
ui =
Ki
|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
[(xi − hi)− (xj − hj)] , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (4)
where hi = h˜i ⊗ [1 0]T , with some feedback gain Ki ∈ Rn×2n. The cardinality |Ni| is used
for normalization purpose [24, 25]. Since UAV motion is modeled as a second-order system
with acceleration input, Ki takes the form of
Ki = In ⊗ [ki,pos, ki,vel] .
With the state equation in (2) and control input in (4), the overall closed-loop dynamics of
the fleet can be written as:
x˙ = Ax+BKL(x− h) (5)
with the overall state x = [xT1 , . . . , x
T
N ]
T and desired formation h = [hT1 , . . . , h
T
N ]
T , where
A = IN ⊗ Ai, B = IN ⊗Bi, K = IN ⊗Ki, L = LG ⊗ In.
Theorem 1 (Theorem of [24]). A controller K stabilizes the formation dynamics in (5) if
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and only if it simultaneously stabilizes the individual N-UAV systems.
x˙i = Aixi +Biui, i = 1, ...N,
yi = Cixi
(6)
Proof. Let M be a Schur transformation matrix of LG where L˜G = M−1LGM is upper
triangular[38]. The diagonal entries of L˜G are the eigenvalues of LG. Clearly M ⊗ In trans-
forms LG ⊗ In into L˜G ⊗ In. Calculating directly,
(M−1 ⊗ In)(A+BKL)(M ⊗ In) = IN ⊗ Ai + L˜G ⊗BiKi (7)
The right-hand-side is an upper triangular and the N diagonal subsystems are of the form:
Ai + λiBiKi (8)
where λi is an eigenvalue of LG. There is one block for each eigenvalue of the Laplacian.
Therefore, the eigenvalues of A+ BKL are those of Ai + λiBiKi where λi is the eigenvalue
of LG corresponding to UAV i. Thus, the stability analysis of the N formation UAVs can
be achieved by analyzing the stability of a single UAVi with the same dynamics modified
by scaler representing the interconnection Lplacian eigenvalues. Consequently, designing the
feedback gain Ki, stabilizing the single vehicle, scaled by the eigenvalue of the Laplacian
leads to a stable formation.
III. Distributed Cyber Attack Detection and Isolation
In this section, the main methodology for detection and isolation of cyber attacks over
a network of UAVs in formation control is presented. The method takes advantage of fault
detection and isolation (FDI) schemes for handling sensor-actuator faults of dynamic sys-
tems. The effect of cyber attack on a networked cyber-physical systems is in essence the
inability of a certain component of over the network; thus, can be treated as a fault in the in-
put/ouput elements of the overall system [39, 40]. A specific model-based diagnostic scheme,
called unknown input observer, is considered to generate the residual signals for checking the
presence of faults. The UIO-based diagnostic scheme is used to detect a class of adversarial
scenarios based on a generalized fault model. The attacks dealt herein are communication
network-induced deception attack and node attack.
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A. Unknown Input Observer
In model-based FDI system, a residual, which is generated as the difference between the
measurement and estimate of the states of the process, is used as an indicator of a presence
of a fault. The residual should be close to zero if and only if a fault does not occur in the
system. This section briefly summarizes the unknown input observer (UIO) scheme [41] for
fault diagnosis of a linear system. .
The UIO considers a fault-free system in the form of the following linear time-invariant
system:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + Ed(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
(9)
where x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm are the state and known input vectors, respectively; d ∈ Rn is
the unknown input vector and the associate input matrix E is of full column rank. In the
presence of a fault, the system dynamics is given by:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) +Bff(t) + Ed(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
(10)
where f(t) is an unknown scalar time-varying function representing evolution of the fault
and/or attack. The fault distribution matrix Bf is assumed to be of full column rank.
A UIO for the system in (9) is given as
z˙(t) = Fz(t) + TBu(t) + Py(t)
xˆ(t) = z(t) +Hy(t)
(11)
where xˆ is the estimated state vector and z ∈ Rn denotes the state variables of the ob-
server. The matrices in the above observer equations must be designed in such a way that
it can achieve decoupling from the unknown input and meet the stability requirement of
the observer. To achieve these condition, choose the matrices F, T, P and H satisfying the
following conditions
(HC − I)E = 0
T = (I −HC)
F = (A−HCA− P1C)
P2 = FH
(12)
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where P = P1 + P2. The state estimation error dynamics will then be:
e˙ = Fe(t) (13)
where F is chosen so that all eigenvalues are stable, e(t) will approach zero asymptotically,
limt→+∞ e(t) = 0, regardless of the values of the unknown input d(t).
Definition 1. The state observer in (11) is called an unknown input observer (UIO) if its
state estimation error vector e(t) = x(t)− xˆ(t) approaches zero asymptotically regardless of
the unknown input d(t).
Theorem 2. [41] The necessary and sufficient conditions for an UIO described by (11) to
be an observer for the system (9) are:
a. rank (CE) = rank(E)
b. (C,A1) is detectable pair where A1 = A−HCA
For the proof, reader advised to look into [41].
B. Cyber Attack on Formation
For the network of UAVs in formation control using the method described in section II, UIOs
can be utilized as a mechanism to detect a possible cyber attack. Since there is no central
agent who can gather all the state information of the UAVs, the UAVs should be able to
detect cyber attacks relying only on the local communication with their neighbors. One way
this work proposes to facilitate this distributed detection is for every UAV to have a bank of
UIOs each of which is associated with a particular attack origin. Then, they consequently
coordinate a corrective action in the network. Two attack types, node and communication
deception attack, are modeled as an unknown disturbance in the UAV’s dynamics. The bank
of UIOs generates a structured set of residuals where each residual is decoupled from one
and only one fault but sensitive to all other faults.
1. Node attack
Assuming the kth UAV is affected by an outside malicious agent and compromised as a unit.
The UAV control input is corrupted and this UAV is no longer following the system-wide
distributed control to perform the formation. This can be due to the incoming measurements
of neighbors’ states being affected by DoS-type attack [42, 43] or compromised at the signal
receiver module of the UAV and making the UAV react to the compromised input. In this
case, the attack affects the kth node system state dynamics directly.
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Such an attack is modeled as a disturbance to the system dynamics of node k:
x˙k = Akxk +Bkuk + b
k
ffk
yk = Ckxk
(14)
where bkf ∈ Rn is the distribution vector and fk ∈ R be the disturbance signal. The detection
scheme employed on ith UAV, the global dynamics of the system can be described as (15),
and the system to be monitored at node i with all possible faults in the formation is
x˙ = (A+BKL)x−BKLh+Bff (15)
yi = C¯ix
where f = [f1...fN ]
T and Bf ∈ RNn×N is a block diagonal matrix in terms of bif elements.
Fault can be rewritten so that the effect of the fault in the kth UAV is evident
x˙ = (A+BKL)x−BKLh+Bkffk +Bk¯ffk¯ (16)
yi = C¯ix
where Bkf is the k
th column of Bf , fk is the k
th component of f , Bk¯f is Bf with the k
th
column deleted and fk¯ is the fault vector with the k
th component removed. In order to
make the observer insensitive to the fk, this fault is regarded as an unknown input where
Bkf is analogous to E in (9). B
k
f = [b
k
f
T
01×(N−1)n)]T where bkf is an n dimensional vector
will all zero entries except one that corresponds a single fault of the faulty UAV k and
C¯i = [Ci 0(N−1)n×(N−1)n]. The UIO implmented at the ith UAV, decoupled from fk and made
insensitive to a disturbance in kth UAV, has the following dynamics:
z˙ki = F
k
i z
k
i + T
k
i Bu+ P
k
i yi (17)
xˆki = z
k
i +H
k
i yi
with xˆki ∈ RnN being the estimate of the N UAVs’ states insensitive to a fault in the kth UAV,
which is computed by ith UAV. Since the formation network is only running the consensus
algorithm, we consider the closed loop dynamics (16), with u = 0 and hence, to incorporate
in the observer design we take B = 0.
The above UIO exists if and only if it satisfies the Theorem 2 conditions. The disturbance
in the kth UAV (node) represented as unknown input by setting E = Bkf , which is the k
th
column of Bf .
Detecting the Node attack
Corollary 1. There exists a UIO for the system ((A + BKL), Bkf ,Ni), if the following
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conditions are satisfied:
a. rank (C¯iB
k
f ) = rank(B
k
f )
b. (C¯, A1) is detectable pair where A1 = A−HC¯A
Proof. we have to show that
rank(C¯iB
k
f ) = rank(B
k
f ) = 1
Denoting the row of C¯i that reads the output of UAV k be c¯
k
i . It is obvious that c¯
k
iB
k
f = 1
since Bkf is a vector with all entries are 0 except k
th is 1. Therefore, with the same token
C¯iB
k
f is a vector with all entries are 0 except k
th is 1, thus making its rank equal to 1.
The second condition of corollary 1, is equivalent to a condition that the transmission
zeros from the unknown inputs to the measurement must be stable [41], i.e. the matrix
rank
sInN − (A+BKL) Bkf
C¯i 0
 is of full rank for all s such that Re(s) ≥ 0, this can be
proved as follows:
rank
sInN − (A+BKL) Bkf
C¯i 0
 = rank
sInN − (A+BKL)
C¯i
+ rank(Bkf ),
where a stable closed loop system (A+BKL), is a full column rank.
Therefore, rank
sInN − (A+BKL) Bkf
C¯i 0
 = nN + 1
Once the existence of the UIO, from the system dynamics in (16) and observer dynamics
from (17) are verified, it is easy to drive the error dynamics and the residual as
e˙ki = F
k
i e
k
i − T ki Bk¯ffk¯ (18)
rki = Cie
k
i
where fk¯ is obtained by removing the k
th fault element of f . Note that the residual dynamics
are driven by all except the kth fault if TiB
k¯
f 6= 0 for i 6= k, making the residual sensitive to
all but the kth fault.
The bank of UIO observers at UAV i generates residual signals for each of its neigh-
bors Ni. Since Bk¯f has full column rank, the UIO residual rki is insensitive only to fk,
treating it as unknown input. With this in mind, the following threshold (T ) logic can be
set:
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if ‖rki ‖ < Tfk ,∀k ∈ Ni then
No fault in the neighbor
else if ‖rki ‖ < Tfk ,∀k 6= j ∈ Ni and ‖rji ‖ ≥ Tfk ,∀j 6= k 6= j ∈ Ni then
Fault in the neighbor node k
end if
2. Attack on the outgoing communication of a Node
The UAVs under formation flight are in constant communication with their neighbors to
compute their relative distance. In this scenario, the kth UAV’s outgoing signals are attacked
by exogenous input or corrupted by a comunication network-induced deception attack while
its control inputs are computed correctly [13]. This scenario covers a DoS attack, malicious
data or noise injection to the UAVs connected to this kth UAV node. The attack can be
modeled in the UAV dynamics as a sensor fault on the information broadcasted from this
affected UAV node. Since this UAV is unaware of its outgoing information being corrupted,
here the two measurements, internal measurement (ϑk) and the broadcast signal (yk), are
isolated as stated in the system dynamics equation (19) below
x˙k = Akxk +Bkuk (19)
ϑk = Ckxk
yk = Ckxk + C
k
f fk
where ϑk ∈ Rn is the internal measurement, fk ∈ Rn being the corrupted broadcast infor-
mation. The closed loop dynamics can be written as
x˙ = (A+BKL)x−BKLh+ Ik¯Γkfk (20)
ϑ = Cx
y = Cx+ C¯kf fk
where y ∈ RNn×N is the communicated measurement and the corrupted feed to the network
is Ik¯Γ
k where Ik¯ is obtained from identity matrix InN with the k
th diagonal element replaced
with block of 0n×1 and Γk is the kth column of the KLC matrix to account for the internal
measurement of kth UAV not being affected. A UAV node k will distinguish between an
attack on the node itself and the outgoing communication based on its internal measurement.
Corollary 2. There exists a UIO for the system ((A + BKL), Ik¯Γ
k, C¯i), if the graph G is
connected.
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Proof. First note that Ik¯Γ
k, is the kth column of KLC with kth entry set to zero, where
both K and C¯i are full rank matrices. Therefore, if G is connected, node k has at least
one neighbor. Denoting the row of C¯i that reads the output of node k as c¯
k
i and rank of
(c¯ki Ik¯Γ
k) = rank (Ik¯Γ
k) = 1.
The second condition of Theorem 2 is the detectability of a fault. It can be stated as:
a fault is detectable if the transfer function of scalar m faults fk(t) = [f1(t), ...fm(t)] to
y(t) is not identical to zero, i.e. the rank of
sInN − (A+BKL) Ik¯Γk
C¯i 0
 = nN + m, for
all s such that Re(s) ≥ 0. Here we deal with a single fault occurrence at a time, m = 1.
Rank
sInN − (A+BKL) Ik¯Γk
C¯i 0
 = rank
sInN − (A+BKL)
C¯i
 + rank (Ik¯Γk) = nN + 1
where a stable closed loop system (A + BKL), is a full column rank. Ik¯Γ
k matrix is a
principal submatrix of the graph Laplacian. In [44] it was shown that any principal matrix
of a connected undirected graph Laplacian matrix is invertible and so the last column is
independent of the rest.
Therefore, rank
sInN − (A+BKL) Ik¯Γk
C¯i 0
 = nN + 1, is full column rank.
C. UAV Under Attack Removal
The main role of FDI system here is to provide information about possible cyber attack or
faults (detection) in the system and determine the location of the fault or attack (isolation)
to enable an appropriate reconfiguration to take place. Corrective action will be made to
eliminate the threat or minimize the effect on the overall performance of the system [45, 46].
In flight control system, it is important to determine the best appropriate control action
following a system failure in order to ensure safe operation and continuity of service. Once a
faulty, a compromised or a malicious UAV is detected, a fault handling system would either
depend on a fault tolerance controller or remove the UAV from the formation and maintain
the system running possibly with graceful degradation of its performance. Here, the later
alternative will be considered. Removing the compromised UAV node needs deleting the
node followed by updating the communication graph and the control law in the consensus
algorithm. An algorithm developed on top of what was presented in our previous work [47]
with the necessary conditions to automatically remove the faulty/malicious UAV node.
To make sure removing a node in the graph will not create two or more disconnected
graphs, the following assumption put forward. The graph G is assumed a 2-vertex-connected,
i.e., after losing any single vertex it remains connected.
Definition 2. A graph G is 2-connected if | V(G) | >2 and for every x ∈ V(G) the graph
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G − x is connected.
Theorem 3. A connected graph G with at least three vertices is 2-connected iff for every two
vertices x, y ∈ V(G), there is a cycle containing both.
Proof. (sufficient condition): If every two vertices belong to a cycle, no removal of one vertex
can disconnect the graph. (necessary condition): If G is 2-connected, every two vertices
belong to a cycle.
Since a 2-connected graph is also 2-edge connected, i.e., after losing any single edge, it re-
mains connected [48]. The graph model in the formation setup is cyclic from the arrangement
and wireless broadcasting communication nature of the UAVs.
The algorithm proposed described in Figure 2 is with the assumption that at most there
is one compromised UAV with either of attacks at the neighborhood i. The algorithm will
remove the faulty UAV node-k from the network and updates the communication graph and
control law.
Figure 2: Compromised UAV Node removal and Formation control in the presence of an
attack.
Each node identify the compromised UAV in the network using its bank of UIOs and
update its communication graph accordingly. The graph theory property is exploited to
remove the compromised UAV node. First, the adjacent matrix A is updated to Af , where
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its element ai,j corresponding to faulty node k is updated to a
f
i,j as follows:
afi,j = 0, if i = k or j = k, for ∀i, j (21)
Second, the indegree matrix D is updated to Df , where its diagonal element updated to
dfi,i as follows:
dfi,i = di,i − 1, if i 6= k for ∀i (22)
dfi,i = 0, if i = k for ∀i (23)
Finally, the Laplacian matrix is updated and the control input gain is re-calculated using
equation (1) and (5) respectively.
IV. Numerical Examples
A. Fault/Cyber Attack detection
To simulate the two cyber attack types, a position offset and a communication deception are
introduced in one of the UAVs in the formation setup. A bank of UIO based fault detection
scheme is implemented on each of the UAVs, while each monitoring its neighbors to detect a
cyber attack and identify the faulty or compromised UAV in the network which is connected
according to the communication graph. For a numerical simulation purpose, an attack only
on UAV-2, and the distributed attack/fault detection bank of UIOs on UAV-1 is considered.
First, a fault/attack free formation flight of 6 UAVs presented to see if the consensus based
distributed controller managed to keep a specified hexagon formation flight of the UAVs.
1. A Fault/Attack Free Formation Flight
To illustrate the formation control, six UAVs at a hexagon corner considered with a formation
vector h˜ = [(2 , 0)T (1 ,−1.73)T (−1 ,−1.73)T (−2 , 0)T (−1 , 1.73)T (1 , 1.73)T ], hexagon
centered at (0, 0) and radius of 2 meters. The distributed control maintains a hexagon
formation as illustrated in Figure 3. The UAVs considered to be in a level flight and started
from arbitrary x, y positions.
2. Node Attack
UAV-2 is suffering from a node attack, modeled as an offset in its position in the formation
setup (14). The node attack, offset in the UAV-2’s x-position is introduced in the time
interval between 0.5 and 4 seconds. It is evident from Figure 4 that the hexagon formation
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Figure 3: Six UAVs in Hexagon formation.
is no more in place for the specified time period not only for the affected UAV but also
the others. This is because the consensus algorithm uses the relative position of the UAVs
in the formation to calculate the feedback gain, hence the others will be affected too. The
node attack on UAV-2 effect is seen in the Figure 5(a), where the UAVs are no more able
to maintain their x-position to complete the hexagon formation. The effect of the attack
as an offset is more pronounced on a directly compromised UAV-2, while on its neighbors
much subdued as it is affecting them through a feedback. UAV-2 also reacted differently
since it had the disturbance, modeling the attack, in its own dynamics as it is given on the
fault scenario (14). A bank of UIOs’ residuals at UAV-1 for each of its neighbor is plotted
in Figure 5(b). As it can be seen, from Figure 5(b), the residual corresponding to UAV-2
is zero while all other are larger, i.e. the UIOs at UAV-1 is made by design insensitive to a
fault introduced by UAV-2 in the network of the UAVs. Using the threshold logic presented
in section III.B.1, the agent UAV-1 not only detects the cyber attack in the network but also
identifies UAV-2 as being a compromised node in the formation.
3. Out going Communication Attack
Much of the vulnerability of UAVs to a cyber attack is due to their communication to
their surrounding environment. To illustrate a communication induced deception attack
in the network of UAVs under formation flight, two form of attacks are presented with
different capability of an adversary in question: Offset introduced and Noise injection in
the communication channel. A UAV under out going communication attack can distinguish
between an attack on the node itself and the outgoing communication based on its internal
16 of 26
x-postion [m]
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
y-
po
sti
on
 [m
]
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Hexagon Formation of six UAVs 
UAV 1
UAV 2
UAV 3
UAV 4
UAV 5
UAV 6
Figure 4: Formation UAV-2 under node attack in the time interval 0.5 and 4 seconds.
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Figure 5: (a) x-position error introduced in the formation due to the node attack in the time
mark between 0.5 and 4 seconds. (b) Residual generated at UAV-1.
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measurement.
Offset Introduced : Assume an adversary manages to get access to the broadcasting
module of the UAV-2 in the network and introduced a bias in the outgoing broadcasted
signal of UAV-2 as explained in section III.B.2 (19). The bias introduced at a time mark of
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Figure 6: Hexagonal formation UAV-2 under offset introduced communication induced de-
ception attack in the time interval 0.5 and 4 seconds.
4 seconds into the flight. UAV-2 is not aware of its outgoing signal is being corrupted while
still computing its own control signals correctly.
As it can be seen in Figure 6, the other five UAVs except the one maliciously sending a
corrupted signal to the rest, are in a hexagon formation. As they trust the signal coming
from the UAV-2, they align themselves or reach consensus on the wrong measurement to
the hexagon formation. UAV-2 is in offset, since it calculates its control signal from the
uncorrupted measurement it has taken but still follows the rest of the UAVs as it is running
the consensus algorithm. While building a bank of UIOs at each UAV, the concept behind is
that each UAV should be able to check if it is behaving correctly using its internal measure-
ment and communicated signals from its neighbors. As compromised UAV is not aware of its
own transmitted data being corrupted and assumes all neighbor UAVs are misbehaving. As
illustrated in Figure 7(b), a bank UIOs based residuals generated at UAV-1 detects a cyber
attack and also successfully identifies UAV-2 as the compromised node using the threshold
logic. After the FDI system detects and isolates UAV-2 is compromised, at this point UAV-2
can redefine its communication security key to avoid itself being disconnected from the rest
of the formation flying UAVs.
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Figure 7: (a) Hexagonal formation, UAV-2 under offset introduced communication deception
attack (b) Residual generated at UAV-1.
Noise Injected in the Communication Path: Here, it is assumed that the adversary
knows the communication channel model. This enables it to corrupt the message shared by
UAV-2 with a random signal or inject a false data into the signals being communicated. With
the same argument as in case of ′Offset Introduced′ above, the signal received by the rest
of the UAVs is being corrupted as it passed through the vulnerable communication channel
in that attack time interval. As it can be seen in in Figure 8, the consensus algorithm is
unable to keep the formation in place, especially the one being affected by the noise, UAV-2.
As illustrated in Figure 9(b), a bank of UIOs based residual generated at UAV-1, all the
residuals except residual from UAV-2 is non-zero, indicating the source of attack is UAV-2.
B. UAV Under Attack Removal
In a formation flight when one of the UAV misbehaves, either because of the above mentioned
cyber attack or a fault, the formation flight will be no more in place. An attack introduced
early, 4 seconds in the hexagon formation flight. The hexagon formation flight disrupted
(Figure 11) as the compromised UAV-2 behaves differently due to the disturbance in its own
dynamics representing the effect of the cyber attack. As it could be seen for a short instant
in Figure 10(a), the FDI system detect and identified the malicious or compromised UAV as
UAV-2. The compromised UAV made the over all formation flight short of any use. Once an
attack detected in the formation flight, faulty node UAV removal algorithm invoked. With
the assumption forwarded, the connection graph is 2-connected, removing the compromised
UAV will not create two separate network of UAVs which can’t communicate to each other to
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Figure 8: Formation under UAV-2 node random data injection attack at a time mark between
2 and 5 seconds.
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Figure 9: (a) x-position error introduced in the formation due to the UAV-2 node random
data injection attack at a time mark between 2 and 5 seconds. (b) Residual generated at
UAV-1.
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Figure 10: (a) Residual generated at UAV-1. (b) x-position random offset error introduced
in the formation at node UAV-2 at a time mark 4 seconds into the flight.
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Figure 11: Faulty or Under attack UAV removal in Hexagon formation flight.
21 of 26
reach consensus on their formation flight variables. The algorithm results in the removal of
the UAV-2 as it can be seen in Figure 11. The formation flight is kept in place with missing
corner of the hexagon formation at node 2. If the formation flight was meant for find and
rescue mission or sensor networks, it would serve the purpose with degraded performance
than losing the whole purpose of the flight.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, detection of cyber attacks has been considered on a network of UAVs in
formation flight. Because of the nature of formation flight and the control algorithm used, a
distributed fault detection and isolation scheme proposed based on a bank of an unknown in-
put observers which only requires local measurements. The proposed fault detection scheme
not only able to detect a cyber attack but also successfully identified the compromised UAV
in the formation network. Furthermore, an algorithm has been proposed to safely and auto-
matically remove the faulty UAV or a UAV under attack while keeping the formation with
degraded but functioning performance. Finally, a numerical case study have been given
with a typical example of six UAVs in a hexagon formation with a possible node and com-
munication deception attacks. Finally, a numerical case study has demonstrated that the
residual generated at the monitoring node UAV able to successfully detect and isolate the
cyber attack. Also, the faulty UAV removal algorithm has been shown effectively remove the
compromised UAV to maintain the formation accordingly. Future work includes extension
of the proposed scheme to handle more complex attack patterns and applying the method
for other types of multi-UAV coordination missions.
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